The Strategic Calculus of India-Israel Alignment Under Narendra Modi

The Strategic Calculus of India-Israel Alignment Under Narendra Modi

India’s diplomatic posture toward Israel has undergone a structural transformation under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, transitioning from decades of covert defense cooperation and public non-alignment to overt strategic partnership. The October 2023 outbreak of the Gaza war did not initiate this realignment; rather, it functioned as an exogenous shock that stress-tested and accelerated an existing geopolitical trajectory. By evaluating New Delhi’s response through the frameworks of realist statecraft, defense-industrial dependency, and domestic political economy, it becomes clear that India’s policy is driven by hard security imperatives and economic connectivity rather than ideological affinity alone.

The Structural Evolution of the Bilateral Relationship

For over four decades following Indian independence in 1947, New Delhi’s Middle East policy was governed by strict adherence to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. This stance was rooted in three primary constraints: domestic political sensitivity regarding India’s large Muslim minority, economic reliance on Arab Gulf states for energy imports and remittance flows from Indian expatriate workers, and diplomatic dependence on Arab bloc votes at the United Nations regarding the Kashmir dispute.

Full diplomatic relations were not established until 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of the Madrid Peace Conference. Even after normalization, successive Indian governments maintained a policy of hyphenation—balancing every engagement with Tel Aviv with a corresponding diplomatic gesture toward Ramallah.

Under the Modi administration, beginning in 2014, India systematically dismantled this hyphenation. The operational mechanism was strategic de-hyphenation: treating the Israel relationship and the Palestinian question as entirely separate diplomatic tracks. This culminated in Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel—the first by an Indian prime minister—which deliberately omitted a stop in Ramallah.

When Hamas launched its attack on October 7, 2023, Modi’s immediate condemnation of terrorism, devoid of any initial reference to the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the two-state solution, demonstrated that de-hyphenation had survived its most severe operational test. While India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) subsequently recalibrated its rhetoric to reaffirm support for a negotiated two-state solution and dispatched humanitarian aid to Gaza, New Delhi consistently abstained from or voted cautiously on UN resolutions that failed to explicitly condemn Hamas.

The Three Pillars of Indo-Israeli Convergence

To understand why the Gaza conflict accelerated rather than derailed this alignment, one must isolate the core variables sustaining the partnership. The relationship rests on three distinct pillars of national interest.

1. Defense-Industrial Integration and Co-Development

Israel is not merely an arms vendor to India; it is a critical node in India’s defense modernization and indigenization strategy. Historically, India relied heavily on Soviet and Russian military hardware. As Russian supply chains degraded due to the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions, Israel’s role as a reliable provider of high-end subsystems—radar, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), electronic warfare suites, and air defense missiles—became indispensable.

Unlike traditional Western defense contractors, which impose stringent end-user monitoring agreements and restrict technology transfer, Israeli defense firms have consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage in joint ventures and co-production. This aligns directly with Modi’s flagship Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) initiative.

  • Operational Synergy: During the 2019 Balakot airstrikes and the 2020–2021 border standoffs with China in Ladakh, Indian forces relied heavily on Israeli-origin Heron drones, Spice-2000 precision-guided munitions, and Searcher surveillance systems.
  • Supply Chain Reciprocity: The Gaza war inverted the traditional buyer-seller dynamic. Facing acute munitions shortages and export restrictions from some Western suppliers, Israel turned to Indian defense manufacturers. Joint ventures established in India—such as the Adani-Elbit Advanced Systems India facility in Hyderabad—reportedly supplied Hermes 900 drones and artillery shells to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the conflict. This bidirectional supply chain locks both nations into a mutually dependent defense ecosystem.

2. Geoeconomic Connectivity and the I2U2 Architecture

India’s grand strategy in West Asia is increasingly defined by infrastructure connectivity designed to bypass Pakistan and counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Israel serves as the western maritime terminus for these ambitions.

💡 You might also like: The Border Where the Ink Runs Dry

The formation of the I2U2 grouping (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States) formalized a trans-regional economic framework focused on joint investments in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. Building on the 2020 Abraham Accords, I2U2 allowed India to integrate its ties with Israel and the Gulf states into a single strategic theater, removing the zero-sum choice that previously constrained New Delhi.

In September 2023, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi, leaders announced the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The proposed multimodal transit network relies on shipping goods from Indian ports to the UAE, moving them via rail across Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the Israeli port of Haifa, and shipping them onward to Europe. Notably, the Israeli port of Haifa had been acquired in early 2023 by a consortium led by India’s Adani Group for $1.2 billion.

The Gaza war froze the immediate operationalization of IMEC, exposing the vulnerability of regional infrastructure to asymmetric security shocks. However, rather than causing India to abandon the Israeli node, the conflict reinforced New Delhi’s commitment to securing the Haifa-to-UAE corridor as a long-term strategic necessity, predicated on the eventual resumption of Saudi-Israeli normalization.

3. Counter-Terrorism Doctrine and Intelligence Sharing

Both India and Israel view themselves as status-quo powers confronting state-sponsored, asymmetric, and Islamist militancy. This shared threat perception underpins deep, largely opaque intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation.

Under the Modi government, India’s national security doctrine shifted from strategic restraint to proactive deterrence, evidenced by cross-border strikes against militant infrastructure in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Indian security planners closely study Israeli operational tactics, intelligence fusion, and border management technologies. Following the October 7 attacks, Indian intelligence agencies sought detailed operational assessments from their Israeli counterparts regarding Hamas’s tactical innovations—specifically the use of commercial drones, subterranean tunnel networks, and saturation rocket attacks—to fortify India’s own border defenses along the Line of Control with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with China.

The Cost Function of Alignment: Managing Externalities

A rigorous analysis cannot treat India’s pivot toward Israel as cost-free. Every strategic alignment carries externalities that must be managed through diplomatic calibration. New Delhi faces three primary constraints that prevent an unconditional embrace of Tel Aviv.

The Gulf Arab Equilibrium

India’s energy security and macroeconomic stability remain tethered to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Millions of Indian nationals reside in the Gulf, sending back tens of billions of dollars in annual remittances. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are among India’s top trading partners and sources of foreign direct investment.

During the Gaza war, India’s diplomatic challenge was to support Israel’s right to self-defense without alienating Riyadh or Abu Dhabi. New Delhi achieved this by mirroring the pragmatic posture of the UAE and Saudi leadership—both of whom condemned the humanitarian toll in Gaza while avoiding diplomatic ruptures with Israel or abandoning long-term regional integration plans. India’s abstentions at the UN General Assembly aligned closely with the subtle hedging practiced by key Gulf capitals, demonstrating that New Delhi’s Israel policy is calibrated against Gulf tolerance thresholds.

The Iran Variable and the Chabahar Bottleneck

While Israel views Iran as an existential threat, India views Iran as a vital strategic counterweight to Pakistan and a gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan. India has invested heavily in developing the Chabahar Port in southeastern Iran to operationalize the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), providing a trade route to Russia and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistani territory.

The escalation of the shadow war between Israel and Iran—including direct missile exchanges and Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea—placed India in a precarious position. Houthi disruptions in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait directly threatened Indian maritime trade, forcing the Indian Navy to deploy an unprecedented number of destroyers and frigates to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea to protect commercial vessels. Simultaneously, New Delhi had to maintain diplomatic channels with Tehran to ensure the security of Indian crew members on seized vessels and protect its investments in Chabahar, even as Washington threatened new sanctions.

Global South Leadership Aspirations

India actively positions itself as the leading voice of the Global South, a diplomatic brand it leveraged extensively during its 2023 G20 presidency. However, the Gaza conflict created a sharp divergence between India and much of the developing world, particularly nations in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, which viewed Israel’s military campaign through an anti-colonial lens.

Countries like South Africa, which brought genocide charges against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and Brazil adopted fiercely critical postures toward Tel Aviv. By refusing to join the consensus condemnation of Israel, India risked eroding its diplomatic capital among Global South states. New Delhi attempted to mitigate this friction by decoupling its bilateral security ties with Israel from its multilateral humanitarian diplomacy—increasing funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and sending relief supplies to Gaza while maintaining defense exports to Israel.

Domestic Political Economy and Ideological Convergence

While structural realism explains the continuity of India’s Israel policy, domestic politics explains its velocity and visibility under the Modi administration. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) operates from a Hindu nationalist (Hindutva) ideological framework that views the historical experience of Hindu civilization as analogous to that of the Jewish people—both framed as ancient cultures reclaiming sovereignty in their ancestral homelands against external aggression.

This ideological resonance has reshaped India’s domestic political calculus:

  1. Neutralization of the Domestic Veto: Historically, Indian political parties feared that overt alignment with Israel would alienate Muslim voters in key electoral states. Under the BJP, which relies on consolidating a broad Hindu vote bank rather than courting minority blocs, this electoral constraint has largely evaporated.
  2. Information Ecosystem Alignment: During the Gaza conflict, Indian social media and mainstream broadcast networks displayed overwhelming popular support for Israel’s military campaign, framing it as a mirror image of India’s own struggle against cross-border terrorism. This domestic consensus insulated the Modi government from internal political blowback, allowing foreign policy elites to pursue strategic alignment without domestic friction.

Strategic Imperatives Moving Forward

The Gaza war stripped away the remaining diplomatic ambiguities surrounding the India-Israel relationship, revealing an alliance anchored in hard material interests rather than transient political sentiment. As the regional security architecture in West Asia undergoes forced restructuring, India’s policy trajectory will be governed by three operational priorities.

First, New Delhi must institutionalize the separation of defense supply chains from diplomatic rhetoric. India will continue to absorb Western and Israeli defense technologies while scaling up domestic co-production facilities. To insulate these supply chains from international legal challenges or multilateral arms embargoes, Indian defense planners will increasingly route bilateral defense trade through private-sector joint ventures rather than state-owned enterprises, reducing direct sovereign exposure.

Second, India must execute a dual-track maritime security strategy in the Western Indian Ocean. With the Red Sea corridor vulnerable to asymmetric disruption by Iranian-backed proxies, the Indian Navy will expand its permanent forward presence in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Concurrently, New Delhi will accelerate diplomatic efforts to revive the IMEC framework once a durable ceasefire is established in Gaza, hedging its bets by maintaining operational readiness at both Haifa and Chabahar.

Third, Indian diplomacy will formalize issue-based minilateralism over broad multilateral consensus. Recognizing that its alignment with Israel creates friction within traditional forums like the UN General Assembly and BRICS, India will prioritize agile, interest-driven coalitions—such as I2U2 and bilateral security dialogues with moderate Arab states—to advance its economic and security objectives without yielding to ideological pressure from the broader Global South.

EC

Emily Collins

An enthusiastic storyteller, Emily Collins captures the human element behind every headline, giving voice to perspectives often overlooked by mainstream media.