Bored soldiers clicking through a rental car menu shouldn't be how a military spots a potential security leak. Yet during Norway's September 2026 exercise Øvelse Hovedstad around Oslo, Akershus, and strategic sites like Gardermoen Airport, Home Guard troops discovered that rented Chinese-made vehicles—including Deepal models from Changan—had automatically recorded and stored video footage of personnel movements, travel routes, and access codes typed into facility gates.
Let's be honest about what happened before anyone jumps to spy-thriller conclusions. Reports from outlets like Dagens Næringsliv and follow-up coverage from TechRadar and AFP make clear there's no public evidence that Chinese intelligence ever received those recordings, and soldiers deleted the stored clips they found. Still, watching a rental car's onboard cameras log troops getting in and out, stopping at sites, and keying in security codes is unsettling. Even more striking, units kept driving the vehicles through the exercise because they lacked enough alternatives.
Here's the uncomfortable truth behind the Norwegian military security fears over Chinese smart cars: obsessing solely over country-of-origin labels misses the bigger engineering reality. Any modern software-defined vehicle packed with cameras, microphones, radar, GPS, and telematics is essentially a rolling sensor array. Focusing only on a carmaker's passport can create a false sense of safety while troops keep typing gate codes in plain sight of lenses or pairing work phones with unfamiliar infotainment stacks.
What Actually Happened During Norway's Exercise
Øvelse Hovedstad, held from September 14 to 18, 2026, involved roughly 5,000 territorial defense troops testing wartime readiness and critical infrastructure protection in the capital region. Rather than relying purely on organic military fleets, the armed forces used commercial rentals supplied through First Rent A Car Norway AS (a Hertz-branded operator), a chain of ownership tied back to Zhejiang Geely Holding Group via Volvo Cars, alongside vehicles including Deepal models made by state-controlled Changan Automobile.
Lieutenant Fredrik Blanck told Dagens Næringsliv that personnel stumbled onto the recordings while exploring vehicle settings out of boredom. Neither the soldiers nor their unit had requested recording features or received clear guidance on how to manage them. Clips showed who entered and exited the cars, pickup points, route patterns, dwell times at locations, and keycard-plus-PIN entries at military gates.
That detail—keying in access codes within view of a recording camera—is a classic operational slip. You don't need a state-sponsored cyber operation to compromise a gate code when a camera records your fingers pressing the keypad.
A camera that stores what it sees creates a security exposure even when zero bytes leave the vehicle.
Norwegian military spokesperson Caroline E. Lysne noted that the armed forces recognize risks tied to vehicles and other electronic gear, yet argued that a blanket ban based solely on country of origin would bring limited security gains compared with practical disruptions for troops, staff, and suppliers. Meanwhile, Hertz Norge stated it complies with Norwegian and European law and doesn't share rental customer data with manufacturers or third parties without legal grounds, and Volvo Cars said data can't be shared with Geely without a clear legal basis. Changan did not respond to media queries.
Why Nationality Alone Is a Flawed Yardstick
When headlines shout about Chinese connected cars and military data in Norway, it's tempting to draw a clean line: Chinese brand equals danger, Western or European brand equals safe. In practice, automotive supply chains are way too tangled for neat borders.
Take joint ventures and contract manufacturing. A vehicle wearing a familiar European badge can still be built in China through joint ventures—such as Volkswagen Group partnerships or BMW's Spotlight Automotive venture with Great Wall Motors—or carry Chinese-sourced electronics, modems, and subassemblies. Conversely, a car built in Europe or North America can still feature sentry modes, dashcams, cabin mics, cloud telemetry, and third-party apps that log location history and surrounding activity.
Look at how different militaries and regulators are tackling this problem across 2025 and 2026:
- Function-based base rules: Poland's armed forces restricted Chinese-made vehicles at protected military sites in February 2026 while tying entry conditions to recording capabilities—requiring functions that log location, video, or sound to be switched off and banning work phone connections to vehicle systems.
- Fleet recalls and base exclusions: Israel's military moved to pull roughly 700 Chinese-made vehicles back from officers starting in late 2025, while defense installations and contractors elsewhere—including around Britain's Special Boat Service base at Poole and Turkish defense firms—have restricted foreign electric or connected vehicles.
- Brand lists and supply-chain rules: Reporting from Der Spiegel in November 2026 pointed to internal German Bundeswehr lists naming BYD, Geely, and Nio models alongside restrictions on certain foreign drones, while the United States has moved ahead with phased connected-vehicle restrictions targeting foreign software and hardware in coming model years.
What stands out here isn't a single uniform playbook. It's a tug-of-war between genuine counterintelligence precautions, fleet logistics, and broader trade friction over electric vehicles and hybrids in Europe.
Data Exfiltration vs. Local Data Exposure
In security discussions, people often lump two very different risks together. First, there's exfiltration—whether a vehicle's cellular modem, backend servers, or maintenance diagnostics transmit data outside the country or to unauthorized parties. Norway experienced a separate public debate over connected transport in 2025 during testing of a Chinese bus by operator Ruter, where technical scrutiny highlighted remote server links for diagnostics, updates, and battery management.
Second, there's local storage and physical access. Even if a car never phones home to a foreign server, onboard storage holds a treasure trove of pattern-of-life data. In Norway's case, recordings sat right inside the vehicle systems where soldiers found them—and where anyone else with physical access to a returned rental car could potentially inspect, extract, or mishandle un-wiped media if procedures fail.
Honestly, treating "no confirmed leak yet" as "nothing to worry about" is a mistake. Pattern-of-life footage collected across days of drills—showing staging areas, convoy or shuttle timing, and gate routines—has real analytical value even before a single packet crosses a border.
Hands-On Lessons From Fleet and Security Reality
Having spent years looking at how organizations roll out connected hardware under budget and schedule pressure, I can tell you policy memos fail the moment they collide with real-world operations. If a unit has ten rental cars and eight of them have cameras enabled by default, telling troops "don't use those" doesn't work when the mission still has to move.
Three practical traps show up over and over again:
- Default-on consumer features: Automakers design dashcams, sentry modes, and voice assistants for convenience and insurance claims, not operational security. If a feature records automatically out of the box, untrained users won't realize it's active.
- Infotainment phone pairing: Syncing an official or work smartphone to a rental car's Bluetooth or projection system can leave call logs, contacts, messages, or location crumbs behind in the head unit. That's why restricting work-phone connections on sensitive trips matters so much.
- Rental return blind spots: Commercial rentals cycle rapidly between civilian drivers, fleet technicians, and subsequent customers. Without verified data-wipe checks and clear contracts, whatever a car recorded stays a liability after the keys go back.
None of this means every smart car is a spy pod or that civilian drivers should panic when buying an EV. For everyday commuters, privacy concerns revolve around commercial data collection, location tracking, and app permissions rather than military counterespionage. For defense forces and critical infrastructure operators, though, convenience and cost savings shouldn't outrun basic sensor hygiene.
Practical Steps for Organizations and Drivers
Whether you manage sensitive facilities, run corporate fleets, or just drive a modern connected car, tightening sensor discipline takes concrete habits rather than hand-waving.
- Audit recording before every trip: Check dashcam, sentry, cabin camera, and microphone settings before driving near restricted sites, and turn off automatic recording where permitted.
- Shield access codes and sensitive chats: Never type gate PINs or hold operational discussions where exterior or interior cameras and mics can capture them.
- Keep work devices off rental infotainment: Avoid pairing work phones or accessing sensitive accounts through rental or unfamiliar vehicle screens.
- Build sensor rules into procurement: Require rental and fleet contracts to specify recording capabilities, data-retention limits, and clear reset procedures before vehicles enter sensitive service.
Norway's Wake-Up Call On Chinese Cars
This short video gives a quick visual recap of how the Norwegian military rental car recordings unfolded and why connected-vehicle sensors have become a defense concern.