Marc Rowan Is Right About Private Equity Valuations

Marc Rowan Is Right About Private Equity Valuations

Marc Rowan doesn't care if he makes his peers uncomfortable. The Apollo Global Management CEO recently took a sledgehammer to one of the private equity industry's most guarded secrets: the way they "mark" their books. If you’ve followed private markets for more than five minutes, you know the drill. While the S&P 500 swings wildly based on every Fed whisper or geopolitical hiccup, private equity portfolios often look like a flat line of steady, upward growth. Rowan calls foul on this. He’s basically saying the emperor has no clothes, or at least that the emperor’s tailor is using some very creative measurements.

The core of the issue is "mark-to-market" versus "mark-to-model." In public markets, your company is worth exactly what someone will pay for it at 4:00 PM EST. In private capital, it’s worth what the fund manager says it’s worth, based on internal spreadsheets and "comparable" companies. Rowan’s critique hits at a time when the gap between these two worlds is becoming impossible to ignore. He’s arguing that the industry’s reliance on these stale or overly optimistic valuations isn't just a quirk of accounting. It’s a systemic risk that hides the true volatility of these assets.

The Myth of Private Equity Smooth Returns

Investors love private equity because it doesn't look volatile. Pensions and endowments flock to these funds because they don't have to report 20% drawdowns to their boards when the rest of the market is tanking. But Rowan’s point is that this lack of volatility is often an illusion. It’s "volatility laundering." If you own a lemonade stand and the price of lemons triples while sales drop, your business is worth less. It doesn't matter if you haven't sold the stand yet.

Private equity firms argue that they're long-term holders. They say they don't need to price assets every day because they aren't selling every day. That’s true, but it doesn't mean the value hasn't changed. When Rowan rips these marks, he’s pointing out that the industry has become too comfortable with valuations that reflect where they want the world to be, rather than where it actually is.

Why the Math Does Not Add Up

Look at interest rates. When the Fed hiked rates aggressively, the cost of debt for every private-equity-backed company skyrocketed. Most of these deals are built on piles of leverage. If your interest expense doubles, your cash flow shrinks. In a rational world, your valuation multiple should also shrink. Yet, many private funds kept their marks steady or even moved them up during the hiking cycle.

They use "adjusted EBITDA" to paper over the cracks. This is basically a "burn-it-all-down" version of earnings where you add back every possible expense. Rowan is calling for more honesty. He knows that if you actually applied public market multiples to many private portfolios, the "alpha" these firms claim to produce would vanish.

The Divergence Between Apollo and the Pack

It’s fascinating to see Rowan take this stance because Apollo isn't exactly a small player. But Apollo has spent the last few years pivoting. They're moving toward private credit and insurance-linked assets via Athene. They want to be seen as a provider of "fixed income replacement" rather than just a traditional buyout shop.

By trashing the industry's valuation methods, Rowan is distancing Apollo from the "black box" reputation of private equity. He’s betting that transparency will attract the massive pools of retail and institutional capital that are currently wary of "stale" marks. He wants Apollo to be the adult in the room.

The Problem With Exit Math

The real test of a mark happens at the exit. For years, private equity firms could rely on a friendly IPO market or another buyout firm to buy their companies at a premium. That bridge is out. The IPO window has been finicky, and the "sponsor-to-sponsor" trade is getting harder as everyone realizes they're all holding the same overvalued assets.

When a firm marks a company at 15x earnings for three years and then tries to sell it, only to find the best bid is 10x, the game is up. This "valuation gap" is why deal flow slowed down so much in late 2024 and 2025. Buyers aren't stupid. They see the public comps. They know the private marks are often works of fiction. Rowan is essentially telling his colleagues to stop lying to themselves so the market can actually start moving again.

Why You Should Care About Stale Marks

You might think this is just billionaire-on-billionaire drama. It isn't. If you have a 401(k), a pension, or an insurance policy, you're likely exposed to these marks. If a pension fund thinks its private equity bucket is worth $1 billion when it’s actually worth $800 million, they’re making bad decisions about how much they can afford to pay out to retirees.

Stale marks also create a "denominator effect." When public stocks crash, the percentage of a portfolio held in private equity looks much larger because those marks haven't moved. This forces funds to stop investing in new deals, even when the best opportunities are available. It’s a self-inflicted wound caused by a refusal to acknowledge reality in real-time.

The Coming Valuation Reckoning

We’re starting to see the cracks. Secondary markets—where investors sell their stakes in private funds—are trading at significant discounts. If a fund says its assets are worth 100 cents on the dollar, but the secondary market is only paying 80 cents, the market has already decided the marks are wrong.

Rowan’s vocal criticism acts as a catalyst. He’s giving permission for other LPs (Limited Partners) to start asking tougher questions. Don't be surprised if we see a wave of "down-rounds" in the private equity world. It’s necessary. You can’t have a healthy market built on spreadsheets that everyone knows are tweaked to show a specific result.

How to Navigate This Shift

If you're an investor or a business leader, the "Rowan doctrine" suggests a few immediate changes in how you look at private capital. Stop taking reported IRRs (Internal Rate of Return) at face value. They're easily manipulated by the timing of cash flows and bridge financing. Look at MOIC (Multiple of Invested Capital) instead—how many actual dollars came back versus how many went in.

Focus on cash-on-cash returns. Paper gains don't pay the bills. If a fund manager can't show you realized exits at their marked valuations, those marks are just marketing material. Rowan is pushing for a world where private capital is judged by the same harsh standards as everything else. It’s going to be a painful transition for firms that have lived off the "smooth volatility" lie, but it’s the only way to build a sustainable industry.

Check the debt structures. Companies with floating-rate debt in a "higher for longer" environment are the most likely to have inflated marks. If the manager hasn't marked those down yet, they're likely hiding a problem. Rowan’s bluntness might seem like a betrayal to some in the industry, but it’s actually a service to the market. Honesty is finally becoming a competitive advantage in private equity.

Demand more frequent, third-party valuations. The era of "trust us, we’re experts" is ending. If you’re putting money into these vehicles, you need to see the underlying data. You need to know which public companies they're using as comparables and why. If the math looks too good to be true, it probably is. Rowan isn't just ripping the marks; he’s ripping the veil off a system that’s been too opaque for too long. Stick to managers who prioritize transparency over "smoothed" charts. Reality always wins in the end.

KK

Kenji Kelly

Kenji Kelly has built a reputation for clear, engaging writing that transforms complex subjects into stories readers can connect with and understand.